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1 Introduction
The collective action failure  the tragedy of the commons" in Hardins
(1968) apt expression is a core problem in economics and in political sci-
ence. It a¤ects all goods and services that need to be produced collectively
like general or local public goods or common lobbying for group specic ben-
ets. Because production is collective, an individuals benet from the good
depends on the group she is a part of. But her costs of participating in group
activities are privately incurred. This lack of coordination makes individuals
contribute less than what would be optimal for the group.
Collective action poses two types of coordination problems. The rst one
is on the individual contribution. The second concerns the very denition of
the goals of the group.1
The rst problem is the most studied (lack of) coordination at the stage of
the individual decisions on how much to contribute.2 The di¢ culty  often
impossibility  to coordinate and to monitor the execution of any potential
agreement by the group leads to the well-known free-rider" problem.3
The second coordination problem, previous to the individual contribution
stage, has caught far less attention. It deals with the very denition of the
specic cause the group will be asked to contribute to. There are instances in
which the relevant community and the good to be produced are obvious and
the regular institutions (e.g. the municipality) o¤er the natural channel for
reaching an agreement on how to distribute the benets. Typical examples
are irrigation, sewerage or water supply.4 However, most often there are no
1A third type of coordination problem which we do not study here is the endogenous
formation of competing groups. Several papers have studied this problem: see Anesi
(2007), Bardhan and Singh (2004) , Esteban and Ray (2008), and references therein.
Anesi (2007) adds a lobbying-formation game a la Mitra (1999) (where forming a lobby
involves a xed cost Fi for group i) to the model of Esteban and Ray (2001). Anesi shows
that the typical free-riding problem at the e¤ort choice stage (which he calls moral hazard
in teams) may raise large groupsequilibrium lobby size and also the total contribution to
lobbying of large groups with low organizational costs. The possibility to free-ride in the
second stage (choice of e¤ort) lowers the cost of being a member of the lobby and thereby
increases participation in lobbying activities. In other words, moral hazard in teams
decreases individual contributions to lobbying but raises the number of contributions.
2The literature on collective action failure is surveyed by Sandler (1992).
3Monitoring and sanctions may alleviate this problem. Experimental evidence is ex-
amined in Andreoni et al. (2003), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Masclet et al. (2003) and
eld evidence in irrigation systems in India in Bardhan (2000).
4Development economics has been very concerned with the collective production of
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natural channels to facilitate coordination in the denition of the common
ends. The coordination problem then is usually solved by means of external
political entrepreneurs who take the lead by proposing a coalition aiming at
the production of some good (or bundle of goods) and a particular distri-
bution of the benets.5 Obvious examples are NGOs and most social and
political movements.
The role of entrepreneurial leaders however does not come free of charge.
Leaders primarily seek personal success and reappointment and this may
partially clash with the goals of the individual members of the group. While
helping individuals to coordinate to dene a common platform they may go
beyond what would be group optimal because of their thirst for success. In
this paper we shall study the role of leaders in dening the group platforms.
The literature on collective action (and rent-seeking) has assumed that
the goal of each group is to maximize the probability of success in obtaining
a given monetary prize or budget, leaving little role for an entrepreneurial
leader. That social movements  and even lobbies just seek for mone-
tary benets clearly dees the most elementary casual evidence. Cornes and
Sandler (1984, 1994) and Esteban and Ray (2001), instead have considered
group goals that are a mixture of public and private goods. In their models,
though, the public/private composition of the group platform was supposed
to be exogenously given and common to all groups. Further, the benets of
the private component of the platform are supposed to be uniformly distrib-
uted within the group.
How are group platforms chosen? If the essential problem in collective
action is free-riding, it is obvious that the size of the private benets will be
key in determining individual contributions. This is the focus of our paper.
We study the role of leaders in setting the group platform which species the
mixture of goods to be produced and the distribution of the divisible benets
among the members.6 Leaders of groups with di¤erent characteristics (in our
model, group size) relevant for the determination of free-riding will choose
public goods and the role of institutions. See the recent panoramic paper by Banerjee et
al (2008).
5On leadership in collective action, see Frolich et al (1971), Calvert (1992) and Colomer
(1995). Cai (2002) empirically examines the characteristics of the community that are
conducive to group decision or to external leadership.
6Some papers have endogenized sharing rules, e.g. Lee (1995) and Ueda (2002). To
our knowledge ours is the rst paper to endogenize the degree of public / privateness of
the goal.
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their platforms in order to alleviate the collective action failure. We will
assess the cost of leadership by comparing the leaders choice with the (utility-
maximizing) group optimal platform.
We extend the model of Esteban and Ray (2001) and of Banerjee et al.
(2008) in which groups compete for the access to a budged that nances a
mixture of public/private good. In our case, the share of privateness and
how this private part is distributed within the group is chosen by the leader
to maximize her probability of success. In our model, the produced private
goods can be distributed either uniformly as in Esteban and Ray (2001) or
linked to individual performance in order to create incentives.7 Following
Nitzan (1991) we call the uniform split the egalitarian rule and the split
linked to incentives the relative e¤ort rule.8 The success probability of each
group depends on the resources contributed relative to the total. These
contributions are private and hence the most studied coordination failure
of collective action arises: individuals free-ride on the e¤ort by their fellow
group members. Our game has two stages. First the platform is chosen by
the group leader and at the second stage individuals privately decide how
much to contribute.
Our results are the following. We rst solve for the group optimal plat-
form dened as the platform that maximizes the utility of the representative
group member assuming no coordination at the e¤ort decision stage, i.e. ef-
fort contributions are private decisions and not group decisions. We show
that the degree of publicness chosen is increasing in the group size and that
the preferred distribution of the private benets is the egalitarian rule over
the relative e¤ort rule in spite of the potentially benecial e¤ects of incen-
tives on free-riding in the e¤ort decision stage. Against this (group decision)
benchmark we contrast the choices made by opportunistic leaders. We nd
that the platform chosen by the leader is biased towards more privateness
7Olson (1965) already mentioned the introduction of incentives as the way to solve the
free-riding problem. Bandiera et al. (2005) obtain experimental evidence on the e¤ects of
using piece-rate in collective action.
8Lee (1995) and Ueda (2002) endogenize the choice of the sharing rule in a two-stage
game. In the rst stage each group chooses the sharing rule from all possible linear
combinations of the egalitarian and the relative e¤ort rule that maximizes the groups
joint welfare. In the second stage individuals make their e¤ort choices. In both papers
(which assume linear benet functions for the prize and linear cost functions for e¤ort) all
groups with a size smaller than half of the total population choose to give all the weight
to the relative e¤ort rule. Notice that the relative e¤ort rule gives the highest weight to
incentives and therefore maximizes win probabilities.
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and distributes the private benets on the basis of relative performance. This
bias for privateness increases with group size. The existence of a bias in the
decisions of opportunistic leaders is not a surprise since their interests are
not aligned with those of the community. However, it is surprising that the
divergence of goals of the leader vis-a-vis the community produces a social
loss to the group only if the leader is allowed to depart from equality and es-
tablish incentives. Concerning the old discussion whether large groups are at
disadvantage in collective action we obtain the anti-Olsons result that they
are not: under both systems  group decision and opportunistic leaders
larger groups have a higher success probability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model
is presented. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium of the private contributions
in the second stage of the game. Section 4 is devoted to the choice of platform
in the rst stage of the game. We start by solving the benchmark case
of group decision and then derive the platform and distribution rule that
would be chosen by an opportunistic leader. The e¢ ciency properties of
the platform are discussed and it is shown how the choice of the platform
varies with group size and its e¤ect on win probabilities is derived. Section 5
puts together the di¤erent results obtained and identies the di¤erent losses
generated by leadership. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to a
technical appendix.
2 The Model
Suppose that there areG di¤erent types of public goods and the same number
of types of preferences, accordingly with the type of public good individuals
prefer. Individuals are assumed to derive utility from their own type of public
good only. Let n be the total population and n1; n2; :::; nG be the population
of the G types of preferences. Without loss of generality, we assume that
ni  ni+1:
We assume that people with the same preferences form a group. Each
group is organized as a lobby (or political party), competing with the op-
posing groups in view of controlling the allocation of the public budget b.
Group competition is modelled as a two-stage game. In the rst stage the
group platform is xed and in the second stage individuals privately decide
how much to contribute.
The group platform has two ingredients: (i) the share  of the budget
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b to be allocated to the production of the group-specic public good, and
(ii) the specication of how the private good produced with the remaining
budget will be allocated among the group members.
We will study two di¤erent ways in which the private good is transferred
to the group members: an egalitarian split and transfers intended to provide
incentives for collective action. In the latter case the platform species that
each individual receives a proportion of the group money equal to their share
of total group e¤ort.
Platforms are set by group leaders who only care about the probability
of success and therefore choose the platform in view of maximizing the win
probability of the group they lead irrespective of the private cost of the
contributions to the group members.
In the second stage, in view of the group platform and of the contri-
butions by the others, individuals decide how much to contribute to the
collective cause. Individual contributions determine the win probabilities of
each group. Finally the winning group is chosen by nature. We assume that
the contribution always is a private decision and hence individuals free-ride
on the e¤ort chosen by their fellow group members.
Individuals contribute e¤ort ri in support of the platform of their group.
We choose these units of e¤ort so that e¤ort is added across group members
to yield group e¤ort Ri. As in Esteban and Ray (2001) we model the utility
cost of e¤ort c(r) as an increasing smooth, convex function with c0(0) = 0
and c0(1) =1, and with an elasticity (r)
(r) =
rc
00
(r)
c0(r)
 1:9 (1)
We make the standard assumption that the probability that alternative
i will be chosen, pi, equals the e¤ort level of group i, Ri, relative to the
aggregate amount of e¤ort R exerted by all groups. Therefore, letting rik be
the e¤ort contributed by individual k of group i, we have that
pi =
Ri
R
=
krik
R
:10 (2)
9This elasticity plays a crucial role for the main results of Esteban and Ray (2001). In
particular in their model (r)  1 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the uncondi-
tional reversal of Olsons results, that is, that the win probabilities be strictly increasing
in group size irrespective of the group platform.
10Notice that the win probability is not dened when Rj = 0;8j. We shall simply
assume that in this case pi = nin .
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Individual preferences are additively separable in the concave valuation of
the public good, v(:), and the linear valuation of the private good. On v(:) we
assume it be strictly concave with the Inada limit conditions: limz!0 v0(z) =
1 and limz!1 v0(z) = 0. Furthermore, we assume that v0(b)  1nG . This
assumption simply establishes the size of prize b relative to the (largest)
group size.
As already mentioned, we will study two di¤erent rules how to distribute
the private good. The rst rule, the egalitarian rule, consists of an egalitarian
division among all group members. In this case, individual decisions cannot
modify the size of the transfer. The second rule, the relative e¤ort rule,
establishes incentives to reward the e¤ort contributed; each group member
receives a proportion of the group money equal to their share of total group
e¤ort. Hence, the transfer received (1 i)brik
Ri
does depend on individuals
decisions rik.
In the case of egalitarian transfers the expected utility uik of member k
of group i is given by
uik = pi

v (ib) +
(1  i) b
ni

  c(rik) (3)
and with incentives it is
uik = pi

v (ib) +
(1  i) brik
Ri

  c(rik): (4)
For convenience we denote by !ik(i; ni; rik) the payo¤ of member k of
group i in case of victory. Therefore, either under egalitarian transfers
!ik(i; ni; rik) = !i(i; ni) = v (ib) +
(1  i) b
ni
; (5)
or under incentives
!ik(i; ni; rik) = v (ib) +
(1  i) brik
Ri
: (6)
In general, we will write
uik = pi!ik(i; ni; rik)  c(rik): (7)
This game has two stages. First, groups or leaders choose the platform
and then individuals privately decide how much to contribute. We solve the
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game backwards. In the next section we characterize the Nash equilibrium
of the contributions game for given platforms that is played in the second
stage of the game. In section 4 we shall deal with the rst stage of the game.
3 Equilibrium Contributions in the Second
Stage of the Game
In the second stage, given the group platforms, individuals choose their e¤ort.
We assume that each individual takes its best course of action, given the
behavior of the rest of the population  both, fellow group members and
the rest and hence free-rides on the e¤ort contributed by the other group
members. Therefore, in view of (2) the e¤ect of an increase in e¤ort rik on
the win probability will be strictly increasing and strictly concave. Indeed,
@pi
@rik
=
R Pk rik
R2
=
1
R
(1  pi) > 0:
and
@2pi
@r2ik
=   1
R2
(1  pi)  1
R
@pi
@rik
=   2
R2
(1  pi) < 0:
Di¤erentiating uik with respect to e¤ort rik we obtain
@uik
@rik
=
@pi
@rik
!ik(i; ni; rik) + pi
@!ik(i; ni; rik)
@rik
  c0(rik): (8)
The e¤ect of rik on !ik depends on whether the sharing rule is egalitarian
or the relative e¤ort rule. In the rst case the change in e¤ort has obviously
no e¤ect on !ik. For the relative e¤ort case !ik is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in rik. Di¤erentiating we have
@!ik
@rik
= (1  i)bRi   rik
R2i
> 0;
and
@2!ik
@r2ik
=   2
Ri
@!ik
@rik
< 0:
We rst show that the rst order condition
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@uik
@rik
= 0 (9)
implies a within-group symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For each group i there is a unique ri that satises (9) for each
individual k.
Proof See appendix.
Lemma 2 states that (9) indeed characterizes a maximum.
Lemma 2 In each case  egalitarian and incentives the unique ri maxi-
mizing ui is implicitly given by
(1  pi)
R

v (ib) +
(1  i) b
ni

  c0(ri) = 0 (egalitarian) (10)
(1  pi)
R
(v(ig)+
(1  i) bri
Ri
)+pi
(1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R2i
 c0(ri) = 0 (incentives)
(11)
Proof See appendix.
Notice, that for given R determining ri is equivalent to determining pi.
For future use, we rewrite the FOC that characterize the best response ri
under both sharing rules as:
1
R
(1  pi)!i(i; ni)  c0(piR
ni
) = 0 (egalitarian) (12)
1
R
(1 pi)

v(ib) +
(1  i)b
ni

+
(1  i)b(ni   1)
niR
 c0(piR
ni
) = 0 (incentives);
(13)
where we have used the fact that
ri =
piR
ni
: (14)
Expressions (12) and (13) implicitly dene the win probability pi as a
function of the exogenous parameters (i; ni; b) and of the endogenous value
of R. We shall write
pi =  (R; i; ni; b) (15)
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for the two cases with egalitarianism and incentives. The following Lemma
will be instrumental in proving existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilib-
rium of the contribution game.
Lemma 3 pi =  (R; i; ni; b) is a continuous strictly decreasing function of
R for all i.
Proof See appendix.
Denition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the game is a vector
p and a value R such thatX
j
 (R; j; nj; b) = 1 (16)
and for all j
pj =  (R
; j; nj; b): (17)
Notice that from the equilibrium p; R we can immediately obtain ri for
all i = 1; :::; G using equation (14).
We can now establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For every set of parameters (; n; b) there exists an equilib-
rium of the second stage of the game and it is unique.
Proof See appendix.
It follows that we can write
R = (; n; b): (18)
Therefore, the equilibrium win probabilities are
pi =  ((; n; b); i; ni; b): (19)
We are now set for the analysis of the choice of platform.
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4 Choice of Platform in the First Stage
Leaders choose the platform that maximizes their probability of success, i.e.
the win probability of their group. This objective does not coincide with
the maximization of the expected payo¤ to the representative group mem-
ber. In order to evaluate the potential bias introduced by political leaders
we shall take the utility maximizing platform as a benchmark case. This
platform would result from group decision or if leaders were altruistic. We
shall therefore talk of opportunistic (probability maximizing) and altruistic
(utility maximizing) leaders. We shall thus contrast the choice of platform
made by an opportunistic leader, ohi , with the one that would have been
chosen by an altruistic leader, ahi , where h = e; s stands for the egalitarian
and the relative e¤ort sharing rules.
Leaders take into account that all group members will change their be-
havior in response to changes in i. Leaders know the best reply of each
individual group member and use this information when deciding on the de-
sired platform. Notice that this best reply depends on the e¤ort contributed
by the members of the other groups  through the win probability but
not directly on the specic platform that they might have adopted. There-
fore, an equilibrium will require that there exists a vector of probabilities
such that all the associated platforms  and the individual contributions
be best responses to each other.
For the sake of completeness let us introduce the formal denition of
equilibrium of the full two stage game.
Denition 2 The vectors (r; kh), k = a; o and h = e; s, are an equilibrium
if, given the vector kh, each rik is best response and, given the vector r, each
khi is best response.
4.1 Preliminaries
An opportunistic leader will choose ohi so as to maximize pi. The corre-
sponding rst order condition for a maximum implies that ohi solves
dpi
di
= 0:
An altruistic leader instead seeks to maximize the expected utility of
group members. The rst order condition implies that ahi solves
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dui
di
=
dpi
di
!i + pi
d!i
di
  dc
di
: (20)
Developing the di¤erentiation and reorganizing terms equation (20) can be
rewritten as
dui
di
=

!i   R
ni
c0(pi
R
ni
)

dpi
di
+ pi
d!i
di
  pi
ni
c0

pi
R
ni

dR
di
= 0: (21)
Observe that for leadership and our benchmark case we will need to compute
dpi
di
. Di¤erentiating (19) we obtain,
dpi
di
=
@ (i)
@R
dR
di
+
@ (i)
@i
:
We start by computing dR
di
. Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to R and i
we get X
j
@ (j)
@R
dR +
@ (i)
@i
di = 0:
That is
dR
di
=  @ (i)
@i
1P
j
@ (j)
@R
(22)
Reorganizing and substituting above, we obtain
dpi
di
=
@ (i)
@i
 
1 
@ (i)
@RP
j
@ (j)
@R
!
: (23)
By Lemma 1 we know that pi is a strictly decreasing function of R. It
follows that the fraction within the braces is positive and strictly less than
1. So, the braces are always positive and less than 1. Hence,
Remark 1 The sign of dpi
di
is equal to the sign of @ (i)
@i
.
Furthermore, in view of (22) we also have the following useful result:
Remark 2 The sign of @R
@i
is equal to the sign of @ (i)
@i
.
Note that in the derivation of (22) and (23) we have not made any as-
sumption on whether the distribution of the private benets was egalitarian
or based on incentives. Hence, Remarks 1 and 2 are valid for both cases.
These two remarks will be essential in characterizing the optimal platforms.
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4.2 The Group Optimal Benchmark
We start with the benchmark case of the choice made by altruistic leaders
maximizing the well-being of the representative group member. We will
rst derive the group optimal platform under an egalitarian sharing rule
aei . Then we will show that the egalitarian sharing rule is part of the overall
preferred group optimal platform. In other words we will prove that altruistic
leaders will not introduce the relative e¤ort rule. Finally, we will derive some
properties of the group optimal sharing rule relative to group size.
We rst examine the chosen platform under an egalitarian sharing of the
private good. Recalling the rst order condition for a maximum, we have
that aei solves
dui
di
=
dpi
di
!i + pi
d!i
di
  dc
di
= 0:
We can easily compute that
d!i
di
= b

v0(ib)  1
ni

:
Since v(:) is a strictly concave function and because of our assumption
that v0(b)  1
nG
it is immediate that there is a unique oi 2 (0; 1] that maxi-
mizes !(b; i; ni).
Clearly, when the win payo¤!i is maximal so are the incentives to supply
e¤ort and hence the win probability. However, an altruist leader should
also take into account the individual cost of supplying such e¤ort. The
following result shows that an altruist leader still would choose to maximize
the equilibrium win payo¤.
Proposition 2 Under an egalitarian division the optimal platform chosen by
an altruistic leader aei maximizes the equilibrium win payo¤. This platform
is implicitly dened by
niv
0
(aei b) = 1: (24)
Proof See appendix.
Notice that aei is independent of all the endogenous variables and hence
independent of the platforms chosen by the other groups under any type of
leadership.
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Let raei be the e¤ort contributed by each individual under this platform.
The expected equilibrium payo¤ to each group member will be
uaei =
nir
ae
i
Ri  + niraei
!(aei ; ni)  c(raei ): (25)
We shall now compare this utility with the utility of a representative group
member under the relative e¤ort rule uasi which will allow us to determine
the overall group optimal platform. The expected equilibrium payo¤ to each
group member under the relative e¤ort rule is
uasi =
nir
as
i
Ri  + nirasi
!(asi ; ni)  c(rasi ) (26)
where asi is the group optimal degree of publicness under the relative e¤ort
rule and rasi is the corresponding contributed e¤ort.
Notice that in a second stage equilibrium all members of a group i con-
tribute the same e¤ort and hence each group member receives an equal share
1
ni
of the private good. Therefore for a given i the equilibrium win payo¤
!i = v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni
is the same under the relative e¤ort rule and under the
egalitarian rule. Of course, the resources contributed under the two sharing
rules will in general not be the same. This will allow us to compare uasi and
uaei without characterizing 
as
i .
We have shown that aei maximizes !(:). Therefore,
nir
as
i
Ri  + nirasi
!(aei ; ni)  c(rasi )  uasi :
But since for aei individuals choose r
ae
i 6= rasi , by revealed preference we
have that
uaei =
nir
ae
i
Ri  + niraei
!(aei ; ni)  c(raei ) >
nir
as
i
Ri  + nirasi
!(aei ; ni)  c(rasi )  uasi :
The preference of equality over incentives is not conditioned by the plat-
forms of the other groups. We thus have proven the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let groups choose their own platform. Irrespective of the
platforms adopted by the other groups and of their type of leadership, groups
will choose the platform consisting of aei and the egalitarian distribution of
the private good.
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Proposition 3 has the remarkable implication that if groups were able
to self-organize they would choose an egalitarian distribution of the private
good even if e¢ cient incentives to individual performance were available. It
follows that incentives are a sign that groups were not able to self-organize. In
the following section we will show that incentives are in the personal interest
of opportunist leaders. But before doing so we want to examine the overall
group optimal platform in more detail. In particular, we are interested how
it changes with group size and how it a¤ects win probabilities depending on
group size. From expression (24) the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4 The group optimal platform chosen by an altruistic leader
aei is increasing in the group size, ni.
This proposition tells us that the larger the group the more socially
minded" will be their platform. Therefore, small groups will appear as greed-
ier than large group. This platform choice also a¤ects the win probabilities of
the groups. The following proposition generalizes Esteban and Ray (2001)s
result.
Proposition 5 Under altruistic leadership the win probability pi is increas-
ing in the group size, ni.
Proof See appendix.
Observe that in Esteban and Ray (2001) some restrictions are needed for
win probabilities to always increase with group size. In particular for nearly
linear cost functions the social component of the platform - which is identical
for all groups - has to be su¢ ciently large. We do not need this restriction. In
our model larger groups choose a larger share of publicness in their platform
and thereby mitigate the free-rider problem by reducing the e¤ect of group
size on the payo¤ of group members. This is why larger groups succeed in
having higher win probabilities.
4.3 Opportunistic Leaders
Opportunistic leaders seek to maximize their win probability. We start by
characterizing the chosen ohi under the two di¤erent sharing rules and then
show that opportunistic leaders would opt for the introduction of incentives.
We rst characterize the optimal platform by an external leader under an
egalitarian division.
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Proposition 6 Under an egalitarian division the optimal platform chosen by
an external, opportunistic leader coincides with the group-optimal platform.
This platform oei is implicitly dened by
niv
0
(oei b) = 1: (27)
Proof See appendix.
The intuition for this result is quite straightforward. The e¤ort con-
tributed by individuals is an increasing function of the payo¤ in case of vic-
tory. Hence, opportunistic leaders will choose the composition public/private
that maximizes the value of !i. Notice that in the absence of individualized
incentives leaders act as if they were concerned with the well-being of their
constituency. Without incentives there would be no cost to external, oppor-
tunistic leadership. Our previous results for group decision apply here: the
public good share and the win probability increase with group size.
Opportunistic leaders constrained to be egalitarian choose platforms such
that larger groups have higher win probabilities. This is achieved by assigning
a larger share of the budget to public goods the larger is the group. But this
is an e¢ cient choice by the leader only in as much as the distribution of the
private good is restricted to be egalitarian.
Opportunistic leaders might do better by introducing incentives that link
the amount of the private good received by each individual to her supply
of e¤ort. But now, the larger the share of the public good, the smaller the
budget that can be used as incentives for collective action. We shall now
examine this trade-o¤ and check whether large groups continue to be more
socially mindedand have higher win probabilities.
As a quick reminder, let us recall the implicit characterization of the
optimal individual choice with incentives to e¤ort. Transcribing (13) we
have
1
R
(1  pi)

v(ib) +
(1  i)b
ni

+
(1  i)b(ni   1)
niR
  c0(piR
ni
) = 0 :
This implicitly denes
pi = (R; i; ni):
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The equilibrium R is obtained from the conditionX
j
(R; j; nj; b) = 1:
which implicitly denes
R = (; n):
Hence, the equilibrium win probabilities will be
pi =  ((; n); i; ni) :
External leaders will choose i in order to maximize this equilibrium pi.
Accordingly with Remark 1
sign
dpi
di
= sign
@(i)
@i
:
Di¤erentiating (13) we obtain
@(i)
@i
=
1
R
(1  pi)
h
bv0(ib)  bni
i
  b(ni 1)
Rni
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
=
(1 pi)b
Rni
h
niv
0(ib)  ni pi1 pi
i
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
: (28)
The sign of (28) depends on the sign of its numerator only. This is strictly
decreasing in i, strictly positive for i = 0 and strictly negative for i = 1.
Hence, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 7 Let there be incentives to e¤ort, then an external leader will
choose the unique osi satisfying
niv
0
(osi b) =
ni   pi
1  pi = 1 +
ni   1
1  pi : (29)
Observe that the need for incentives does not make leaders precipitate
complete privateness. However, as shown by the following proposition, the
use of incentives by opportunistic leaders distorts platforms towards less pub-
licness than under an egalitarian split.
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Proposition 8 osi < 
oe
i . Furthermore, 
os
i maximizes waste R.
Proof See appendix.
Under the relative e¤ort rule opportunistic leaders give too much weight
to the private good and therefore overuse incentives relative to what is opti-
mal for the group.
Let us now examine how this distortion a¤ects the relationship between
group size and the publicness of the platform and the win probability in a
given equilibrium. To do this, consider the implicit characterization of the
optimal platform chosen by a leader is given by (29). In any given equilibrium
 and hence for R xed this equation has to hold for all groups, i.e. for
all ni. Therefore, we can obtain the relationship between publicness and
group size by di¤erentiating with respect to  and n in (29) while holding
R constant. We nd that with individual incentives to e¤ort leaders choose
platforms that still give larger groups a higher win probability.
Proposition 9 Let there be incentives to the supply of e¤ort, then the win
probability increases with group size, but the degree of publicness of the plat-
form decreases with size.
Proof See appendix.
The e¢ ciency of the larger groups is at the cost of reducing publicness.
Notice that now it is thanks to an increased share of private goods that larger
groups succeed to have higher win probabilities. With incentives smaller
groups appear to be more socially minded.
But would we observe incentives under external leadership? We shall now
show that, unlike the case of group decision, opportunistic leaders prefer the
use of incentives, irrespective of the platforms and leadership of the other
groups.
Proposition 10 Taking the behavior of the other leaders as xed, all leaders
can increase their win probability by introducing incentives.
Proof See appendix.
We wish to remark two points here. First, leaders prefer to introduce
incentives irrespective of whether the other leaders are using incentives or
not. Secondly, note that moving from egalitarianism to incentives increases
the win probability because it also increases the amount of e¤ort contributed
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by the individual group members.11 From Proposition 10 we directly have
the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Let opportunistic leaders be able to choose the platform,
including the option between an egalitarian distribution of the private good
or incentives. Then, there is a unique equilibrium in which all opportunistic
leaders use the platform osi (hence with incentives).
5 Individual Incentives and the Costs of Lead-
ership
We now summarize the previous results to assess the cost of external leader-
ship.
The rst and basic point to stress is that opportunistic political entrepre-
neurs can have a negative bias only through the use of incentives. If political
entrepreneurs were restricted to use the egalitarian sharing rule they would
choose the group optimal platform. It is due to the use of incentives that
the diverging goals of the leader and the community materialize and pro-
duce ine¢ cient biases. In contrast, in group decision incentives are not used
even if available in spite of the potentially benecial e¤ects of incentives on
free-riding in the e¤ort decision stage.
The contrast with the benchmark group-decision case reveals that lead-
ership biases the platforms towards greater greediness (higher share of pock-
etable benets) and greater resources expended (wasted) into trying to win
command over the budget. Therefore individuals su¤er the costs on two
counts: (i) they dont obtain the public/private mix they would prefer and
(ii) they expend more resources than what they would otherwise do.
These biases vary with group size. The bias towards greediness increases
with group size. While in the group decision case  or opportunistic leaders
deprived from the use of incentives the degree of privateness decreases with
group size, leaders with access to incentives precipitate a degree of privateness
that is increasing in group size.
The second type of bias concerns the over-expending of resources. The
unilateral use of incentives will lead to higher win probabilities, but if all
11Of course, it must also decrease the win probability of other groups. We shall deal
with this issue in the next section.
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groups use incentives and hence spend more resources, it cannot be that all
the win probabilities increase. Therefore, despite the increased spending of
resources some groups will end up with an even lower win probability than
under group decision. This is a third dimension of the loses induced by
opportunistic leaders. The following proposition identies who are the losers
and who are the winners in terms of success probability resulting from the
over-expending of resources.
Proposition 12 Let the cost function have constant elasticity c(r) = 1
1+
r1+
and let v(:) be su¢ ciently close to linearity. There is a threshold level in group
size such that the groups with a smaller size will have a lower win probability
in the equilibrium with incentives than with an egalitarian distribution and
all groups with a larger size will have a higher win probability.
Proof See appendix.
From this Proposition it follows that if the economy were in an equilibrium
with egalitarianism and leaders could compare equilibria, it would be the
leaders of the larger groups the ones that would have an interest in unfolding
a process of introduction of incentives.12
6 Concluding Remark
Free-riding has traditionally been seen as a source of ine¢ ciency in collective
action problems. Because of the failure to coordinate and commit to the
group optimal action, the total resources contributed are below optimal. In
the present paper we point to additional costs on top of this intrinsic inef-
ciency. They result from a coordination problem so far overlooked by the
literature, namely the setting of the group platform, the decision on what
12The case of higher degrees of concavity in v(:) remains to be studied. It seems plausible
that for high degrees of concavity the result gets reversed and the smaller groups are the
main beneciaries.
To see why observe that there are two counter-vailing forces at work. Incentives eliminate
free-rider problems because individuals are rewarded by what they contribute only. On the
one hand, free-riding is more severe in larger groups since an individuals deviation has a
smaller e¤ect on the win probabilities in bigger groups. Hence larger groups benet more
from the elimination of free-riding. On the other hand, smaller groups can pay higher
per unit incentive rates than larger groups. Which e¤ect dominates will depend on the
concavity of v(:).
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exactly groups are ghting for. Group platforms consist of the specication
of the public/private balance and how the private benets will be distributed
within the group.13
The economic analysis of collective action has taken the group platform
as exogenously given. Under this assumption Esteban and Ray (2001) have
proven that the conjecture by Olson (1965) that smaller groups have a higher
win probability is incorrect. They obtain that unless the prize is a pure
private good and the cost of e¤ort is close to linearity large groups have a
higher probability of success. This result is reinforced when group leaders
can choose the platforms in view to limit the e¤ects of free-riding. Indeed, we
nd that both under group decision and under leadership the win probability
increases with group size. However, while the group optimal platform entails
a degree of publicness that raises with group size, opportunistic leaders choose
platforms displaying degrees of publicness that diminish with group size.
Our nal comment refers to future research. In this paper we have con-
trasted the behavior of opportunistic leaders with what would have been
chosen by the group if they had been able to coordinate. In the real world
we observe the two kinds of organizations (and possibly many in between
those extremes). What makes some groups able to reach decisions while oth-
ers simply follow a leader is an open question. Group size has obviously a
role to play14 and so does the importance of the issue at stake.
7 Appendix
Lemma 1 For each group i there is a unique ri that satises (9) for each
individual k.
Proof. For the equalitarian case (9) becomes
1  pi
R

v(ib) +
(1  i)b
ni

  c0(rik) = 0
It is immediate that this equation has a unique solution rik = ri > 0 for all
individuals k of group i.
13As Berry (1977) pointed out even the most socially minded public interest groups
whose primary purpose is the pursuit of collective goods that will not selectively and
materially reward their members have typically lobbied on legislation that a¤ect their tax
cuts - surely a private interest matter. See page 10, footnote 11.
14But in classical Greece the assembly of citizens, the ultimate decision body, could
gather well over 10,000 participants.
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For the case with incentives under the relative e¤ort rule we have that
pi
@!ik
@rik
= pi
(1  i) b(Ri   rik)
R2i
=
(1  i) b
R
(1  rik
Ri
):
Using this fact in (9) and rearranging we obtain
@uik
@rik
=
1
R

(1  pi)v(ig) + (1  i)b

 
(1  i)b)
R2
rik + c
0(rik)

:
Notice that the rst brackets is common to all k of group i and that the
second brackets is strictly increasing in rik. Therefore, there is a unique value
rik = ri =
Ri
ni
that solves @uik
@rik
= 0.
Lemma 2 In each case  egalitarian and incentives the unique ri max-
imizing ui is implicitly given by
1  pi
R

v(ib) +
(1  i)b
ni

  c0(ri) = 0(egalitarian); or (30)
(1  pi)
R
(v(ig)+
(1  i) bri
Ri
)+pi
(1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R2i
 c0(ri) = 0(incentives):
(31)
Proof. Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to ri we obtain the rst order condi-
tion
@ui
@ri
=
1  pi
R
!i + pi
@!i
@ri
  c0(ri) = 0: (32)
We start by noticing that under an egalitarian distribution @!i
@ri
= @
2!i
@2ri
= 0,
with incentives @!i
@ri
= (1 i)b(Ri ri)
R2i
and @
2!i
@2ri
=  2(1 i)b(Ri ri)
R3i
.
Observe now that @ui
@ri
is continuous in ri for R > 0 and that limri!0
@ui
@ri
=
!i
R
> 0 and that limri!1
@ui
@ri
=  1. Therefore, there must exist at least one
ri > 0 for which @ui@ri = 0. Suppose now that ri = 0 and R = 0 so that
pi =
ni
n
< 1. By taking an arbitrarily small ri > 0 we would make pi = 1.
Hence in no case ri = 0 can be a best reply for an individual of type i.
We shall now show that there is a unique ri > 0 satisfying the rst order
condition @ui
@ri
= 0 and that this condition indeed identies a maximum.
Di¤erentiating (32) with respect to ri we obtain
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@2ui
@r2i
=  21  pi
R2
!i + 2
1  pi
R
@!i
@ri
+ pi
@2!i
@r2i
  c00(ri):
We can immediately deduce that under egalitarianism ui is strictly con-
cave in ri.
For the case with incentives this second derivative becomes
@2ui
@r2i
=   2
R2
(1  pi)

v(ib) +
(1  i) bri
Ri

+
2
R
(1  pi)(1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R2i
 pi2 (1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R3i
  c00(ri)
Since the rst and the third term on the right hand side are negative, if we
can show that the second term plus the fourth term are negative, we are
done. Hence, we need to look at
2
R
(1  pi)(1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R2i
  c00(ri)
Using now (31) we obtain
2
R
(1  pi)(1  i) b(Ri   ri)
R2i
  c00(ri)
=
2
R
(1  pi)

c0(ri)
pi
  1
R
(1  pi)
pi

v(ib) +
(1  i) bri
Ri

  c00(ri)
=
2
R
(1  pi)c
0(ri)
pi
  c00(ri)  2
R2
(1  pi)2
pi

v(ib) +
(1  i) bri
Ri

If we can show that 2
R
(1  pi) c0(ri)pi   c00(ri) is negative we are done.
2
R
(1  pi)c
0(ri)
pi
  c00(ri)
=
c0(ri)
ri

2(1  pi)ri
Rpi
  (ri)

=
c0(ri)
ri

2(1  pi)
ni
  (ri)

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since pi = niriR in a symmetric equilibrium. But
2(1 pi)
ni
  (ri) < 0 since
ni  2 and (ri)  1. Therefore @2ui@r2i < 0.
Lemma 3 pi =  (R; i; ni; g) is a continuous strictly decreasing function
of R for all i.
Proof. Using the implicit denition of pi in (12) and (13) for the egalitarian
and incentives rule we observe that  is continuous because both v and c0
are continuous. Furthermore, di¤erentiating with respect to R we have:
@pi
@R
=  
(1 pi)!i
R2
+ pic
00
nj
!i
R
+ Rc
00
ni
< 0 (egalitarian):
@pi
@R
=  
1
R2
(1  pi)

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ (1 i)b(ni 1)
R2
+ pi
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
< 0 (incentives)
Proposition 1 For every set of parameters (; n; g) there exists an equi-
librium and it is unique.
Proof. We have already seen that for each R there is a unique vector of
win probabilities dened by (15). The only point that remains to be proven
is that there is a unique value of R satisfying (16). By Lemma 3 pi is a
continuous strictly decreasing function of R for all i.
An inspection of the rst order conditions (12) and (13) for the egalitarian
and the incentives case, respectively, immediately reveals that in both p! 1
as R ! 0 and p ! 0 as R ! 1. Hence there is a unique R satisfying the
equilibrium condition (16).
Proposition 2 Under an egalitarian division the optimal platform cho-
sen by an altruistic aei maximizes the equilibrium win payo¤. This payo¤ is
implicitly dened by
niv
0
(aei b) = 1:
Proof. Recall that the rst order condition (21) is given by
0 =

!i   R
ni
c0(pi
R
ni
)

@pi
@i
+ pi
@!i
@i
  pi
ni
c0

pi
R
ni

@R
@i
: (33)
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Now replace c0

pi
R
ni

using (9) and use equation (22) for @R
@i
and equation
(23) for @pi
@i
.
Then, the rst order condition becomes
0 =
@!i
@i
 
@ i
@!i
 
1 
@ i
@RiP
j
@ j
@R
!
!i

1  1  pi
ni

+ pi +
pi
R
1  pi
ni
!i
@ i
@!iP
j
@ j
@R
!
Since @ i
@!i
> 0 and
@ j
@R
< 0 8j, the rst term of the sum in the big braces is
positive.
For later use we calculate@ i
@!i
and @ i
@R
explicitly:
@ i
@!i
=
1 pi
R
!i
R
+ Rc
00
ni
(34)
@ i
@R
=  
(1 pi)!i
R2
+ pic
00
ni
!i
R
+ Rc
00
ni
< 0: (35)
We now show that the sum of the second and third term is also positive.
Dividing by pi and rearranging this is equivalent to showing that
1  pi
niR
!i
@ i
@!i
<  
X
j
@ j
@R
After introducing (34) and (35) and rearranging we see that clearly
1  pi
ni
(1 pi)!i
R2
!i
R
+ Rc
00
ni
<
X
j
(1 pj)!j
R2
!j
R
+ Rc
00
nj
+
X
j
pjc
00
nj
!j
R
+ Rc
00
nj
:
Thus, the sign of dui
di
is the same as the sign of @!i
@i
.
Recall that
!i = v(ib) + (1  ) b
ni
:
Since v(:) is concave, it follows that !i(:) is also concave. By di¤erenti-
ation we nd that the maximum is attained for i = 
ae
i , as dened in this
Proposition.
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Proposition 5 Under altruistic leadership the win probability pi is in-
creasing in the group size, ni.
Proof. We can write
dpi
dni
=
dpi
di
@i
@ni
+
@pi
@ni
:
In Proposition 6 we will prove that aei maximizes pi. Hence, the above
expression becomes
dpi
dni
=
@pi
@ni
:
Partially di¤erentiating in (12) we obtain
@pi
@ni
=
Rric
00
(ri)  (1 pi)(1 i)bni
ni!i +R2c
00(ri)
:
Using (12) we nally obtain
dpi
dn
=
Rc
0
(ri) ((ri)  1) + (1  pi)v(ig)
ni!i +R2c
00(ri)
> 0:
Proposition 6 Under an egalitarian division the optimal platform cho-
sen by an external opportunistic leader coincides with the group-optimal
platform. This platform oei is implicitly dened by
niv
0
(oei b) = 1: (36)
Proof. From Lemma 1 we have that the sign of dpi
di
is the same as the sign
of @ i
@i
.
In view of (12) and of (15) we can write
@ i
@i
=
@ i
@!i
@!i
@i
:
We have seen that @ i
@!i
> 0. Therefore, pi is maximal when !i is maximal.
In Proposition 2 we have demonstrated that this maximum is attained for
aei = 
oe
i .
Proposition 8 oi < 
e
i . Furthermore, 
o
i maximizes waste R.
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Proof. Recall that ei satises niv
0(ei b) = 1. Lets look again at (28). Notice
that
niv
0(ib)  1 < ni   1
1  pi for 8i  
e
i
Hence, we have
@(i)
@i
=
(1 pi)b
Rni
h
niv
0(ib)  ni pi1 pi
i
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
< 0 for 8i  ei
Therefore oi < 
e
i . To see that 
o
i maximizes waste R recall that by remark
2 R attains a maximum with respect to i when pi is maximal, i.e. at 
o
i .
Proposition 9 Let the leader be opportunistic and use incentives to the
supply of e¤ort, then the win probability increases with group size and the
degree of publicness of the platform decreases with size.
Proof. We start by performing the di¤erentiation with respect to  and n
in (29). Rearranging we obtain,
di
dni
=  
(1  pi)2v0(ib) 
h
(1  pi) + (ni   1)@(i)@ni
i
(1  pi)2bniv00(ib) : (37)
Notice that because of the concavity of v the denominator is negative.
Hence, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the numerator and
this in turn depends on the sign and size of @(i)
@ni
. We turn now to this.
Let us now partially di¤erentiate pi with respect to ni in the rst order
condition for individual choice to obtain
@i
@ni
=
  1
R
(1  pi) (1 i)bn2i +
(1 i)b
R

ni (ni 1)
n2i

+ piR
n2i
c
00
(piR
ni
)
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
=
(1 i)b
Rn2i
pi +
piR
n2i
c
00
(piR
ni
)
1
R

v(ib) +
(1 i)b
ni

+ R
ni
c00(piR
ni
)
> 0:
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So the sign of di
dni
depends on the sign of
(1  pi)2v0(ib) 

(1  pi) + (ni   1)@(i)
@ni

= (1  pi) [(1  pi)v0(ib)  1] 

(ni   1)@(i)
@ni

= (1  pi)

ni   pi
ni
  1

 

(ni   1)@(i)
@ni

since in the optimal platform (1 pi)v0(ib) = ni pini . But clearly
h
ni pi
ni
  1
i
<
0, so the sign of di
dni
is negative.
Proposition 10 Taking the behavior of the other leaders as xed, all
leaders can increase their win probability by introducing incentives.
Proof. We shall show that even holding the platform i constant the leader
will increase the win probability when introducing incentives.
Notice rst that holding i constant the equilibrium win payo¤ will be
the same in the two cases, !i.
The rst order condition for individual e¤ort in the case of incentives is
1  pi
R
!i + i = c
0
(pi
R
ni
);
where i  (1 i)b(ni 1)niR > 0. Notice, further that the rst order condition
under the egalitarian distribution is the same taking i = 0.
Hence, the result simply follows from the fact that the equilibrium pi is
strictly increasing in i. This can be easily obtained from di¤erentiation and
following the same steps as in previous Propositions.
Proposition 12 For constant elasticity cost functions c(r) = 1
1+
r1+
and v(:) su¢ ciently close to linearity, if we compare the equilibrium with
incentives with that with egalitarianism there is a threshold level of groups
size such that the groups with a smaller size will have a higher win probability
under egalitarianism and all groups with a larger size will have a lower win
probability.
Proof. We shall compute the rst order conditions for the two equilibria.
We shall use the superindices e and i to denote the equilibrium values under
27
egalitarianism and under incentives respectively. For a constant elasticity
cost function the rst order conditions become
1
Re
(1  pej)!ej =

pejR
e
nj

and njv0(
e
jb) = 1
1
Ri
(1  pij)!ij +
(1  i)b(nj   1)
njR
=

pijR
i
nj

and njv0(
i
jb) =
nj   pj
1  pij
Rearranging and dividing the rst order condition for individuals

Ri
Re
+1
=
1 pij
pi

j
1 pej
pe

j
!ij
!ej
+
(1 ij)b
pi

j
nj 1
nj
1 pej
pe

j
!ej
=
f(pij)
f(pej)
!ij +
(1 ij)b
1 pij
nj 1
nj
!ej
=
f(pij)
f(pej)
v(ijb) +
nj pj
1 pij
(1 ij)b
nj
v(ejb) +
(1 ej)b
nj
Introducing the FOC of the leaders we get
Ri
Re
+1
=
f(pij)
f(pej)
v(ijb) + (1  ij)bv0(ijb)
v(ejb) + (1  ej)bv0(ejb)
Assume that v(x) = 1
1 x
1 . Hence v0(x) = x  and v(x) = xv
0(x)
1  . With
this v-function we get
Ri
Re
+1
=
f(pij)
f(pej)
ij + (1  ij)(1  )
ej + (1  ej)(1  )
bv0(ijg)
bv0(ejg)
=
f(pij)
f(pej)
ij + (1  ij)(1  )
ej + (1  ej)(1  )

1 +
nj   1
1  pij

We assume that
ij+(1 ij)(1 )
ej+(1 ej)(1 ) '
ik+(1 ik)(1 )
ek+(1 ek)(1 ) . Note that if  = 0 (i.e. v
linear)
ij+(1 ij)(1 )
ej+(1 ej)(1 ) = 18j. Hence we have that
f(pij)
f(pej)
K

1 +
nj   1
1  pij

=
f(pik)
f(pek)
K

1 +
nk   1
1  pik

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If win probabilities di¤er when we move from no incentives to incentives
there must be at least one group j with pej > p
i
j. If there is more than one
such group, take the largest one. Since f(p) is decreasing in p we have that
f(pij)
f(pej)
> 1. Since p is increasing in group size we have for nk < nj
1 +
nk   1
1  pik
< 1 +
nj   1
1  pij
Therefore for all nk < nj
f(pik)
f(pek)
>
f(pij)
f(pej)
> 1) pek > pik
By construction there is no group larger than nj for which this inequality
holds true.
Similarly, there must be at least one group l such that pel < p
i
l. If there is
more than one such group take the smallest group. Since f(p) is decreasing
in p we now have that we have that f(p
i
l)
f(pel )
< 1. Since p is increasing in group
size we have for nh > nl
1 +
nh   1
1  pih
> 1 +
nl   1
1  pil
Therefore for all nh > nl
f(pih)
f(peh)
<
f(pil)
f(pel )
< 1) peh < pih
Consequently, there is a partition of the groups by a threshold size such that
their win probabilities with incentives increases or decreases relative to the
equilibrium with egalitarian incentives.
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